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The interpretability logic of a mathematical theory describes the struc-
tural behavior of interpretations over that theory. Different theories have
different logics. This paper revolves around the question what logic de-
scribes the behavior that is present in all theories with a minimum amount
of arithmetic; the intersection over all such theories so to say. We denote
this target logic by IL(All).
In this paper we present a new principle R in IL(All). We show that
R does not follow from the logic ILP0W
∗ that contains all previously
known principles. This is done by providing a modal incompleteness proof
of ILP0W
∗: showing that R follows semantically but not syntactically
from ILP0W
∗. Apart from giving the incompleteness proof by elementary
methods, we also sketch how to work with so-called Generalized Veltman
Semantics as to establish incompleteness. To this extent, a new version
of this Generalized Veltman Semantics is defined and studied. Moreover,
for the important principles the frame correspondences are calculated.
After the modal results it is shown that the new principle R is indeed
valid in any arithmetically theory. The proof employs some elementary
results on definable cuts in arithmetical theories.
1 Introduction
Interpretations of one theory or structure into another are omnipresent in (meta-
) mathematical practice. Interpretability logics study the structural behavior
of interpretations. Below we shall provide precise definitions. The structural
behavior of interpretations is different for different kind of theories thus yielding
different interpretability logics.
For example, for finitely axiomatized theories, the corresponding logic turned
out to be ILP as defined below. For theories like Peano Arithmetic with full
induction1 the interpretability logic is ILM. It is a long standing open problem
1Technically speaking the property of so-called essential reflexivity is sufficient. A theory is
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what the core-structural behavior of interpretations is. That is, what is the
interpretability logic that is valid in any sort of theory. It turns out that “any
sort of theory” is a bit too ample a quantification. As we shall see below, we at
least need some core amount of arithmetic as to do coding of syntax. Therefore
the question is often paraphrased as: What is the interpretability logic of all
reasonable arithmetical theories? We denote this logic by IL(All).
This paper revolves around this question and presents some major results.
In [19] a conjecture was posed that IL(All) = ILW∗P0. In this paper we refute
this conjecture by exposing a new arithmetically valid principle. We shall prove
the modal incompleteness of the logic ILP0W
∗ by introducing a new principle
R. Next, we show that the principle R follows semantically from ILP0W
∗ but is
not provable in ILP0W
∗.
We shall expose two proof methods here to prove that R does not follow syn-
tactically from ILP0W
∗. The first, in Section 3, develops some general theory for
proving incompleteness via so-called Generalized Veltman Semantics. However,
it will turn out that the frame condition for the principle W is so ghastly and
cumbersome that however possible to work with, proofs become too involved.
The second proof method, in Section 4, uses the regular Veltman semantics
and some sort of bisimulation argument and a full proof is given that R does
not follow syntactically from ILP0W
∗.
To conclude, we shall prove in Section 5 that actually R is sound in any
reasonable arithmetical theory. In particular, this implies that IL(All) can not
be ILP0W
∗.
We found the principle R by trying to formulate a sufficient condition for
the logic ILP0W
∗ to be modally complete. We think that this illustrates nicely
that a modal formulation of an arithmetical phenomenon can be very useful to
obtain new arithmetical results.
2 Preliminaries
This paper is the third and final in a series of three. All definitions and moti-
vations behind the definitions were already included in [20]. For completeness
and readability we include the main definitions and issues also in this paper.
2.1 Arithmetic and an upper bound to IL(All)
As with (almost) all interesting occurrences of modal logic, interpretability logics
are used to study a hard mathematical notion. Interpretability logics, as their
name slightly suggests, are used to study the notion of formal interpretability.
In this subsection we shall very briefly say what this notion is and how modal
logic is used to study it.
We are interested in first order theories in the language of arithmetic. All
theories we will consider will thus be arithmetical theories. Moreover, we want
essentially reflexive if any of its finite extensions proves the consistency of any finite sub-theory
thereof.
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our theories to have a certain minimal strength. That is, they should contain a
certain core theory, say I∆0 +Ω1 from [13]. This will allow us to do reasonable
coding of syntax. We call these theories reasonable arithmetical theories.
Once we can code syntax, we can write down a decidable predicate ProofT (p, ϕ)
that holds on the standard model precisely when p is a T -proof of ϕ.2 We
get a provability predicate by quantifying existentially, that is, ProvT (ϕ) :=
∃p ProofT (p, ϕ).
We can use these coding techniques to code the notion of formal interpreta-
bility too. Roughly, a theory U interprets a theory V if there is some sort of
translation so that every theorem of V is under that translation also a theorem
of U .
Definition 2.1. Let U and V be reasonable arithmetical theories. An interpre-
tation j from V in U is a pair 〈δ, F 〉. Here, δ is called a domain specifier. It is
a formula with one free variable. The F is a map that sends an n-ary relation
symbol of V to a formula of U with n free variables. (We treat functions and
constants as relations with additional properties.) The interpretation j induces
a translation from formulas ϕ of V to formulas ϕj of U by replacing relation
symbols by their corresponding formulas and by relativizing quantifiers to δ. We
have the following requirements.
• (R(~x))j = F (R)(~x)
• The translation induced by j commutes with the boolean connectives. Thus,
for example, (ϕ ∨ ψ)j = ϕj ∨ ψj. In particular (⊥)j = (∨∅)j = ∨∅ = ⊥
• (∀x ϕ)j = ∀x (δ(x)→ ϕj)
• V ⊢ ϕ⇒ U ⊢ ϕj
We say that V is interpretable in U if there exists an interpretation j of V in
U .
Using the ProvT (ϕ) predicate, it is possible to code the notion of formal
interpretability in arithmetical theories. This gives rise to a formula IntT (ϕ, ψ),
to hold on the standard model precisely when T + ψ is interpretable in T + ϕ.
This formula is related to the modal part by means of arithmetical realizations.
The modal language of interpretability logics is the same as that of prova-
bility logics but now augmented by a binary modality ✄ to denote interpreta-
bility.Thus, we define the interpretability formulas as
FormIL := ⊥ | Prop | (FormIL → FormIL) | (✷FormIL) | (FormIL ✄ FormIL)
Here Prop is a countable set of propositional variables p, q, r, s, t, p0, p1, . . ..
We employ the usual definitions of the logical operators ¬,∨,∧ and ↔. Also
2We take the liberty to not make a distinction between a syntactical object and its code.
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shall we write ✸ϕ for ¬✷¬ϕ. We refer the reader to [20] for more details and
standard reading conventions.
Now we can define the link between the modal language and the arithmetical
counterpart.
Definition 2.2. An arithmetical realization ∗ is a mapping that assigns to each
propositional variable an arithmetical sentence. This mapping is extended to all
modal formulas in the following way.
- (ϕ∨ψ)∗ = ϕ∗∨ψ∗ and likewise for other boolean connectives. In particular
⊥∗ = (∨∅)∗ = ∨∅ = ⊥.
- (✷ϕ)∗ = ProvT (ϕ
∗)
- (ϕ✄ ψ)∗ = IntT (ϕ
∗, ψ∗)
From now on, the ∗ will always range over realizations. Often we will write
✷Tϕ instead of ProvT (ϕ) or just even ✷ϕ. The ✷ can thus denote both a modal
symbol and an arithmetical formula. For the ✄-modality we adopt a similar
convention. We are confident that no confusion will arise from this.
Definition 2.3. An interpretability principle of a theory T is a modal formula
ϕ that is provable in T under any realization. That is, ∀ ∗ T ⊢ ϕ∗. The inter-
pretability logic of a theory T , we write IL(T), is the set of all interpretability
principles.
For two classes of theories, IL(T) is known.
Definition 2.4. A theory T is reflexive if it proves the consistency of any of
its finite subtheories. It is essentially reflexive if any finite extension of it is
reflexive.
Theorem 2.5 (Berarducci [3], Shavrukov [24]). If T is an essentially reflexive
theory, then IL(T) = ILM.
Theorem 2.6 (Visser [29]). If T is finitely axiomatizable, then IL(T) = ILP.
Now we have all in place to define our central subject of interest.
Definition 2.7. The interpretability logic of all reasonable arithmetical theories,
we write IL(All), is the set of formulas ϕ such that ∀T ∀ ∗ T ⊢ ϕ∗. Here the T
ranges over all the reasonable arithmetical theories.
For sure IL(All) should be in the intersection of ILM and ILP. Up to now,
IL(All) is unknown. In [19] it is conjectured to be ILP0W
∗. It is one of the major
open problems in the field of interpretability logics, to characterize IL(All) in a
modal way. As ILP ∩ ILM is known to be a strict upper bound, we also know
some strict lower bounds. We close off this section on preliminaries by defining
these lower bounds and providing modal semantics for interpretability logics.
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2.2 A lower bound to IL(All)
We first define a core logic which will be part of all interpretability logics studied.
Definition 2.8. The logic IL is the smallest set of formulas being closed under
the rules of Necessitation3 and of Modus Ponens, that contains all tautological
formulas and all instantiations of the following axiom schemata.
L1 ✷(A→ B)→ (✷A→ ✷B)
L2 ✷A→ ✷✷A
L3 ✷(✷A→ A)→ ✷A
J1 ✷(A→ B)→ A✄B
J2 (A✄B) ∧ (B ✄ C)→ A✄ C
J3 (A✄ C) ∧ (B ✄ C)→ A ∨B ✄ C
J4 A✄B → (✸A→ ✸B)
J5 ✸A✄A
We will write IL ⊢ ϕ for ϕ ∈ IL. An IL-derivation or IL-proof of ϕ is
a finite sequence of formulae ending on ϕ, each being a logical tautology, an
instantiation of one of the axiom schemata of IL, or the result of applying
either Modus Ponens or Necessitation to formulas earlier in the sequence.
Apart from the axiom schemata exposed in Definition 2.8 we will need con-
sider other axiom schemata too.
M A✄B → A ∧ ✷C ✄B ∧ ✷C
P A✄B → ✷(A✄B)
M0 A✄B → ✸A ∧ ✷C ✄B ∧ ✷C
W A✄B → A✄B ∧✷¬A
W∗ A✄B → B ∧ ✷C ✄B ∧ ✷C ∧✷¬A
P0 A✄✸B → ✷(A✄B)
R A✄B → ¬(A ✄ ¬C)✄B ∧✷C
If X is a set of axiom schemata we will denote by ILX the logic that arises
by adding the axiom schemata in X to IL.
Now, with the results of this paper, we know that ILP0W
∗ is a strict lower
bound for IL(All).
3That is, from ϕ you are allowed to conclude ✷ϕ.
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2.3 Semantics
Interpretability logics come with a Kripke-like semantics. As the signature of
our language is countable, we shall only consider countable models.
Definition 2.9. An IL-frame is a triple 〈W,R, S〉. Here W is a non-empty
countable universe, R is a binary relation on W and S is a set of binary re-
lations on W , indexed by elements of W . The R and S satisfy the following
requirements.
1. R is conversely well-founded4
2. xRy & yRz → xRz
3. ySxz → xRy & xRz
4. xRy → ySxy
5. xRyRz → ySxz
6. uSxvSxw → uSxw
IL-frames are sometimes also called Veltman frames. We will on occasion
speak of R or Sx transitions instead of relations. If we write ySz, we shall mean
that ySxz for some x. W is sometimes called the universe, or domain, of the
frame and its elements are referred to as worlds or nodes. With x↾ we shall
denote the set {y ∈ W | xRy}. We will often represent S by a ternary relation
in the canonical way, writing 〈x, y, z〉 for ySxz.
Definition 2.10. An IL-model is a quadruple 〈W,R, S,〉. Here 〈W,R, S, 〉 is
an IL-frame and  is a subset of W ×Prop. We write w  p for 〈w, p〉 ∈ . As
usual,  is extended to a subset ˜ of W × FormIL by demanding the following.
• w˜p iff w  p for p ∈ Prop
• w 6 ˜⊥
• w˜A→ B iff w 6 ˜A or w˜B
• w˜✷A iff ∀v (wRv ⇒ v˜A)
• w˜A✄B iff ∀u (wRu ∧ u˜A⇒ ∃v (uSwv˜B))
Note that ˜ is completely determined by . Thus we will denote ˜ also by
.
4A relation R on W is called conversely well-founded if every non-empty subset of W has
an R-maximal element.
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3 Generalized semantics
In [27], Sˇvejdar showed the independence of some extensions of IL. Some of
these logics, however, had the same class of characteristic Veltman frames. Na-
turally, frames alone are not sufficient to distinguish between such logics so
Sˇvejdar used models combined with some bisimulation arguments instead. A
generalized Veltman semantics, intended to uniformize this method, was pro-
posed by de Jongh. This generalized semantics was previously investigated by
Vukovicc´ [34], Joosten [18] and Verbrugge and was successfully used to show
independence of certain extensions of IL.
We will set both the generalized Veltman semantics and the model/bisimulation
method to work in order to distinguish some extensions of IL, which are indistin-
guishable using Veltman frames alone. We use a slight variation of the semantics
used in [34]. Any result in this section can be obtained with the old semantics,
we think that nevertheless this might be a useful variation.
Definition 3.1 (ILset-frame). A structure 〈W,R, S〉 is an ILset-frame iff.
1. W is an non-empty set.
2. R is a transitive and conversely well-founded binary relation on W .
3. S ⊆W×W×(P(W )−{∅}), such that (where we write ySxY for (x, y, Y ) ∈
S)
(a) if xSwY then wRx and for all y ∈ Y , wRy,
(b) S is quasi-reflexive: wRx implies xSw{x},
(c) S is quasi-transitive: If xSwY then for all y ∈ Y we have that if
y 6∈ Z and ySwZ then xSwZ,
(d) wRxRy implies xSw{y}.
Definition 3.2 (ILset-model). An ILset-model is a structure 〈W,R, S,〉 such
that 〈W,R, S〉 is an ILset-frame and  is a binary relation between elements of
W and modal formulas such that the following cases apply.
1.  commutes with boolean connectives. For instance, w  A∧B iff. w  A
and w  B.
2. w  ✷A iff. for all x such that wRx we have that x  A.
3. w  A ✄ B iff. for all x such that wRx and x  A there exists some Y ,
such that xSwY and for all y ∈ Y , y  B.
For ILset-models F = 〈W,R, S,〉 and Y ⊆ W we will write Y  A for ∀y ∈
Y, y  A.
As usual, we say that a formula A is valid on an ILset-frame F = 〈W,R, S〉 if
for any model F = 〈W,R, S,〉, based on F , and any w ∈W , we have F ,w  A.
Lemma 3.3 (Soundness of IL). If IL ⊢ A then for any ILset-frame F , F |= A.
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Bewijs. Validity is preserved under modus ponens and generalization and tri-
vially any propositional tautology is valid on each ILset-frame. So it is enough
to show that all axioms of IL are valid on each ILset-frame. We only treat J2:
(A✄B) ∧ (B ✄ C)→ A✄ C.
Suppose w  A ✄ B and w  B ✄ C. Pick some x with wRx and suppose
x  A. There exists some Y with xSwY and Y  B. W.l.o.g. we can assume
that for some y ∈ Y , y 6 C. Fix such a y. Since y  B and wRy there exists
some Z such that ySwZ and Z  C. In particular, y 6∈ Z. And thus we have
xSwZ. ⊣
Theorem 3.4 (Completeness of IL). If A is valid on each ILset-frame, then
IL ⊢ A.
Bewijs. Suppose IL 6⊢ A. Then there exists an IL-model M = 〈W,R, S〉, and
some m ∈ M such that M,m  ¬A. Let M ′ = 〈W,R, S′,′〉, where ′= on
propositional variables and is extended as usual, and
S′ = {(w, x, Y ) | ∀y ∈ Y xSwy}.
It is easy to see that M ′ is an ILset-model. As an example let us see that S is
quasi-transitive. Suppose xS′wX , y ∈ X and yS
′
wY . (We can assume y 6∈ Y ,
but we won’t use this.) Pick y′ ∈ Y . Then xSwy and ySwy
′. Thus xSwy
′. Since
y′ ∈ Y was arbitrary we conclude xS′wY .
A straightforward induction on B shows that for all B we have w ′ B ⇔
w  B. Thus we havem ′ ¬A and in particular A is not valid on the underling
frame of M ′. ⊣
Definition 3.5 (ILsetM0-frame). An ILset-frame is an ILsetM0-frame iff. for
all w, x, y, Y such that wRxRySwY there exists some Y
′ ⊆ Y such that
1. xSwY
′ and
2. for all y′ ∈ Y ′ we have that for all z, y′Rz → xRz.
Lemma 3.6. For any ILset-frame F = 〈W,R, S〉 we have F |= M0 iff. F is an
ILsetM0-frame.
Bewijs. (⇐) Suppose F is an ILsetM0-frame. Let F = 〈W,R, S,〉 be a model
based on this frame. Pick w ∈ W and suppose w  A ✄ B. Pick x ∈ W with
wRx and x  ✸A ∧ ✷C. Now there exists some y with xRy and y  A. Thus,
for some Y , ySwY and Y  B. Since F is an ILsetM0-frame, there exists some
Y ′ ⊆ Y such that xSwY ′ and for all y′ ∈ Y ′ we have that for all z, y′Rz → xRz.
So, in particular, Y ′  ✷C.
(⇒) Suppose F |= M0. Choose w, x, y, Y such that wRxRySwY . Let p, q, s
be distinct proposition variables. Define an ILset-model F = 〈W,R, S,〉 as
follows.
v  p⇔ v = y
v  q ⇔ v ∈ Y
v  s⇔ xRv
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Now, w  p✄ q and thus w  ✸p ∧ ✷s✄ q ∧ ✷s. Also, x  ✸p ∧ ✷s. So, there
exists some Y ′ such that xSwY
′ and Y ′  q ∧ ✷s. But the only candidates for
such an Y ′ are the subsets of Y . Also, since Y ′  ✷s, by definition of  we have
y′ ∈ Y ′ and y′Rz implies xRz. ⊣
Definition 3.7 (ILsetP0-frame). An ILset-frame is an ILsetP0-frame iff. for
all w, x, y, Y, Z such that
1. wRxRySwY and
2. for all y ∈ Y there exists some z ∈ Z with yRz,
we have that there exists some Z ′ ⊆ Z with ySxZ ′.
Lemma 3.8. For any ILset-frame F = 〈W,R, S〉 we have F |= P0 iff. F is an
ILsetP0-frame.
Bewijs. (⇐) Suppose F is an ILsetP0-frame. And let F = 〈W,R, S,〉 be an
ILset-model based on this frame. Let w ∈W and suppose w  A✄✸B. Pick x, y
in W with wRxRy and y  A. There exists some Y with ySwY and Y  ✸B.
Put Z = {z | z  B}. Now for all y ∈ Y there exists some z ∈ Z such that yRz.
So, there exists some Z ′ ⊆ Z with ySxZ ′.
(⇒) Suppose F |= P0. Choose w, x, y ∈ W and Y, Z ⊆ W such that
wRxRySwY and for all y ∈ Y there exists some z ∈ Z with yRz. Let p, q
be distinct propositional variables. Define the ILset-model F = 〈W,R, S,〉 as
follows.
v  p⇔ v = y
v  q ⇔ v ∈ Z
Now, Y  ✸q. So, w  p ✄ ✸q and thus, since w  P0, w  ✷(p ✄ q). So for
some Z ′ we have ySxZ and Z
′  q. But the only candidates for such Z ′ are the
subsets of Z. ⊣
Lemma 3.9. There exists an ILsetP0-frame which is not an ILsetM0-frame.
Bewijs. Consider Figure 1. It represents an ILset-frame. For clarity we have
omitted the following arrows. Those needed for the transitivity of R. Those
needed for the quasi-reflexivity of S. Those needed for the inclusion of S in R.
Additionally, quasi-transitivity dictates that we need xSw{z2}, ySw{z1} and
ySw{z2}. All the other ones are drawn.
Let us first see that we actually have an ILsetP0-frame. So suppose vRaRbSvB.
And let Z be such that for all b′ ∈ B there exists some z ∈ Z such that b′Rz.
It is not hard to see that only for v = w, a = x, b = y and B = {y1, y2} such
a Z exists. And that moreover this Z must equal {z1, z2}. According to the
P0-condition we must find a Z
′ ⊆ Z such that ySxZ. And {z1} is such a Z ′.
Now let us see that we do not have an ILsetM0-frame. Put Y = {y1, y2}. We
have wRxRySwY . So, if we do have an ILsetM0-frame then for some Y
′ ⊆ Y
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Figuur 1: An ILsetP0-frame which is not an ILsetM0-frame.
we have xSwY
′ and for all y′ ∈ Y ′ we have that for all z, y′Rz implies xRz.
But the only Y ′ ⊆ Y for which xSwY ′ is Y itself. We have y2 ∈ Y , y2Rz2 but
not xRz2. ⊣
Theorem 3.10. ILP0 6⊢ M0.
Bewijs. If ILP0 ⊢ M0 then M0 is valid on any ILsetP0-frame. But then any
ILsetP0-frame is an ILsetM0-frame. Which, by Lemma 3.9 is not so. ⊣
Corollary 3.11. ILP0 6⊢ R.
Bewijs. By Theorem 3.10 and the fact that M0 follows from R. ⊣
Definition 3.12. Let F = 〈W,R, S〉 be an ILset-frame. For any wRx we say
that Γ ⊆W is a choice set for (w, x) iff. for all X such that xSwX, X ∩Γ 6= ∅.
Definition 3.13. Let F = 〈W,R, S〉 be an ILset-frame. We say that F is an
ILsetR-frame iff. wRxRySwY implies that for all choice sets Γ for (x, y) there
exists some Y ′ = Y ′(Γ) ⊆ Y such that xSwY ′ and for all y′ ∈ Y ′ we have that
for all z, y′Rz implies z ∈ Γ.
Lemma 3.14. An ILset-frame F = 〈W,R, S〉 is an ILsetR-frame iff. F |= R.
Bewijs. (⇒) Suppose F is an ILsetR-frame. Let F = 〈W,R, S,〉 be a model
based on F . Choose w, x ∈W and suppose wRx, w  A✄B and x  ¬(A✄C).
We have to find some Y ′ with xSwY
′ and Y ′  B ∧ ✷¬C. There exists some
y ∈ W such that xRy, y  A and for all U such that ySxU there exists some
u ∈ U with u  ¬C. Let Γ be a choice set for (x, y) such that Γ  ¬C and
Γ ⊆
⋃
ySxU
U . Since w  A ✄ B we can find some Y such that ySwY and
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Y  B. By the R frame condition we can find some Y ′ ⊆ Y such that xSwY ′
and for all y′ ∈ Y ′ we have that for all z, y′Rz implies z ∈ Γ. So since Γ  ¬C
we conclude Y ′  B ∧ ✷¬C.
(⇐). Suppose F |= R. Let w, x, y, Y ∈ W and suppose wRxRySwY . Let Γ
be a choice set for (x, y). Let p, q, s, t be distinct propositional variables. Define
the ILset-model F = 〈W,R, S,〉 as follows.
v  p⇔ v = y
v  q ⇔ v ∈ Y
v  s⇔ v 6∈ Γ
Now, w  p✄ q. So, w  ¬(p✄s)✄ q∧✷¬s. Also, Γ  ¬s. So, x  ¬(p✄s) and
therefore there exists some Y ′ such that xSwY
′ and Y ′  q ∧ ✷s. Since Y ′  q
we must have Y ′ ⊆ Y . Now let y′ ∈ Y ′ and pick some z for which y′Rz. Then
z  ¬s and thus by definition of , z ∈ Γ. ⊣
Theorem 3.15. ILP0M0 0 R.
Bewijs. Now that we have all the frame conditions at hand, we will provide a
frame that is both a P0 and a M0 frame but not an R frame. We define the
required frame F as follows.
F = 〈W,R, S〉 with W = {w, x, y, a0, a1, b0, b1}
R and S are defined by the minimal requirements below:
wRxRySwA
ySxB
where A = {a0, a1} and B = {b0, b1}
aiRbi for i = 0, 1 and
xRbi for i = 0, 1.
We conclude the proof with a series of easy observations.
1. F is an ILsetM0 frame is clear: let Y
′ = Y = A in Definition 3.5.
2. F is an ILsetP0 frame is clear: let Z
′ = Z = B in Definition 3.7.
3. F is not an ILR frame: Let Γ be a choice set for (x, y) that omits b0. As
for any Y ′ we have ySwY
′ ⊆ Y implies Y ′ = Y , we see that a0 ∈ Y ′. But
a0Rb0 and b0 /∈ Γ.
⊣
We can also formulate a frame condition for W. However it shall turn out
that this frame condition becomes so intricate that it is not efficient to work
with even over finite frames. However, one can check that the exposed counter
frames above are indeed also ILsetW frames. We choose not to do so and rather
give direct proofs that include W in Section 4. We start by defining a higher
order property Not−W on frames. In this definition, capital letters shall range
over subsets and lower case to elements of the domain. The index i is supposed
to run over the natural numbers.
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Definition 3.16.
Not−W := ∃w, z0, {Yi}i∈ω, {yi}i∈ω, yi∈Yi , Z, {zi+1}i∈ω, zi+1∈Z
[∀i ∈ ω(ziSwYi ∋ yiRzi+i) &
∀z ∈ Z∃i ∈ ωzSwYi &
∀z ∈ Z∀Y (zSwY ∧ Y ⊆ (∪i∈ωYi) → ∃z′ ∈ Z∃y ∈ Y yRz′)]
Lemma 3.17. For any ILset frame F we have that
F |= Not−W ⇔ F 6|= W.
Bewijs. ”⇒”: Suppose Not−W holds. We use the same notation as in the
definition and set out to define a valuation so that the instance p✄q → p✄q∧✷¬p
of W fails.
We define
a  p ⇔ a ∈ Z
a  q ⇔ ∃i ∈ ω a ∈ Yi
Now clearly w  p✄ q as ∀z ∈ Z∃i ∈ ωzSwYi and p is only true at points in Z
and the Yi make q true. However, w  p✄ q∧✷¬p can never hold. For, suppose
that some Y and some z ∈ Z we have that zSwY and Y  q. By the definition
of  clearly, Y ⊆ (∪i∈ωYi), whence ∃z′ ∈ Z∃y ∈ Y yRz′) and Y 6 ✷¬p as
z′  p.
”⇐”: Suppose that A✄B → A✄B∧✷¬A fails to hold in w in some model ba-
sed on F . We will set out to find the required z0, {Yi}i∈ω, {yi}i∈ω, yi∈Yi , Z, {zi+1}i∈ω, zi+1∈Z .
As w  ¬(A✄B ∧✷¬A), we can find z0 with wRz0  A such that for no Y
with z0SwY we have Y  B ∧ ✷¬A. To find our other entities, we will need a
technical definition of Rw,z0 of those those worlds that are reachable from w by
means of R and Sw successors.
z0 ∈ Rw,z0 ;
y ∈ Rw,z0 & ySwY ⇒ Y ⊆ Rw,z0 .
Next, we define
Z := {x ∈ Rw,z0 | x  A ∧ (∃Y ∃y ∈ Y (z0SwY ∧ yRx) ∨ x = z0)}
and
Y := {Y ⊆ Rw,z0 | zSwY  B for some z ∈ Z}.
Now it is easy to pick {Yi}i∈ω with Yi ∈ Y and to pick {zi}i∈ω ⊆ Z such that
ziSwYi ∋ yiRzi+1: as the zi  A we can go via Sw to some Y  B whence by
definition Y ∈ Y; as Y 6 ✷¬A, at some R successor z˜ of some y ∈ Y we have
z˜  A whence z˜ ∈ Z.
By the definitions of Z and the Yi we have that ∀z ∈ Z∃i ∈ ωzSwYi. Thus
we only need to check that ∀z ∈ Z∀Y (zSwY ∧ Y ⊆ (∪i∈ωYi) → ∃z′ ∈ Z∃y ∈
Y yRz′). But this is also not hard. If we consider any z ∈ Z and Y for which
zSwY ∧Y ⊆ (∪i∈ωYi), we see that Y  B. But, as also z0SwY , we need to have
Y 6 B ∧ ✷¬A whence we can find some y ∈ Y and z′ ∈ Z with yRz′  B. ⊣
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4 Incompleteness of ILP0W
∗
Let us first calculate the frame condition of R where
R := A✄B → ¬(A✄ ¬C) ✄B ∧ ✷C.
It turns out to be the same frame condition as for P0 (see [18]).
Lemma 4.1. F |= R⇔ [xRyRzSxuRv → zSyv]
Bewijs. “⇐” Suppose that at some world x  A ✄ B. We are to show x 
¬(A✄¬C)✄B ∧✷C. Thus, if xRy  ¬(A✄¬C) we need to go via an Sx to a
u with u ⊢ B ∧ ✷C.
As y  ¬(A ✄ ¬C), we can find z with yRz  A. Now, by x  A ✄ B, we
can find u with ySxu  B. We shall now see that u  B ∧ ✷C. For, if uRv,
then by our assumption, zSyv, and by y  ¬(A ✄ ¬C), we must have v ⊢ C.
Thus, u  B ∧ ✷C and clearly ySxu.
“⇒” We suppose that R holds. Now we consider arbitrary a, b, c, d and e
with aRbRcSadRe. For propositional variables p, q and r we define a valuation
 as follows.
x  p :⇔ x = c
x  q :⇔ x = d
x  r :⇔ cSbx
Clearly, a  p✄ q and b  ¬(p✄¬r). By R we conclude a  ¬(p✄¬r)✄ q∧✷r.
Thus, d  q ∧ ✷r which implies cSbe. ⊣
As P0 and R have the same frame condition we can never find an R-frame on
which P0 fails to hold. However, the following elementary lemma tells us that
it is not necessary to work with frames.
Lemma 4.2. Let M be a model such that ∀w∈M w  ILX then ILX ⊢ ϕ ⇒
M |= ϕ.
Bewijs. By induction on the derivation of ϕ. ⊣
We can now prove the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 4.3. ILP0W
∗
0 R
Bewijs. We consider the model M from Figure 2 and shall see that M |=
ILP0W
∗ but M,a 6 R. By Lemma 4.2 we conclude that ILP0W∗ 0 R.
As M satisfies the frame condition for W∗, it is clear that M |= W∗. We
shall now see that M |= A✄✸B → ✷(A✄B) for any formulas A and B.
A formula ✷(A ✄ B) can only be false at some world with at least two
successors. Thus, in M , we only need to consider the point a. So, supppose
A✄✸B. For which x with aRx can we have x  A?
As we have to be able to go via an Sx-transition to a world where ✸B holds,
the only candidates for x are b, c and d. But clearly, c and f make true the same
modal formulas. From f it is impossible to go to a world where ✸B holds.
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Figuur 2: ILP0W
∗ is incomplete
Thus, if a  A✄✸B, the A can only hold at b or at d. But this automatically
implies that a  ✷(A✄B) and M |= P0.
It is not hard to see that a 6 R. Clearly, a  p ✄ q and b  ¬(p ✄ ¬r).
However, d 6 q ∧ ✷r and thus a 6 ¬(p✄ ¬r) ✄ q ∧ ✷r. ⊣
The following lemma tells us that ILR is a proper extension of ILM0P0.
Lemma 4.4. ILR ⊢ M0,P0
Bewijs. As IL ⊢ ✸A ∧ ✷C → ¬(A ✄ ¬C) we get that A ✄ B → ✸A ∧ ✷C ✄
¬(A✄ ¬C) and M0 follows from R.
The principle P0 follows directly from R by taking C = ¬B. ⊣
We can consider the principle R∗ that can be seen, in a sense, as the union
of W and R.
R∗ : A✄B → ¬(A✄ ¬C)✄B ∧ ✷C ∧ ✷¬A
Lemma 4.5. ILRW = ILR∗
Bewijs. ⊇: A✄B → A✄B ∧ ✷¬A→ ¬(A ✄ ¬C)✄B ∧✷C ∧ ✷¬A.
⊆: A ✄ B → ¬(A ✄ ¬C) ✄ B ∧ ✷C ∧ ✷¬A ✄ B ∧ ✷C; and if A ✄ B, then
A✄B✄((B∧✷¬A)∨✸A)✄B∧✷¬A, as A✄B → ¬(A✄⊥)✄B∧✷⊤∧✷¬A. ⊣
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5 Arithmetical soundness of R
Let us first recall Definition 2.7, that is, the definition of the interpretability
logic of all reasonable arithmetical theories. We shall write IL(All). We defined
IL(All) to be the set of modal formulas that are interpretability principles in
any reasonable arithmetical theory. That is, the set of ϕ for which
∀T∀ ∗ T ⊢ ϕ∗.
In [28] IL(All) was conjectured to be ILW. In [30] this conjecture was
falsified and strengthened to a new conjecture. There it was conjectured that
ILW∗, which is a proper extension of ILW, is IL(All).
In [18] it was proved that the logic ILW∗P0 is a proper extension of ILW
∗,
and that ILW∗P0 is a subsystem of IL(All). This falsified the conjecture from
[30]. In [18] it is also conjectured that ILW∗P0 is not the same as IL(All).
In [19] it is conjectured that ILW∗P0 =IL(All). As we will see below we have
that the logic ILRW is a subsystem of IL(All) and a proper extension of ILW∗P0.
This rejects the conjecture pronounced in [19]. With all this conjecturing and
refuting of conjectures we are rather hesitant in proposing as a new conjecture
that ILRW = IL(All).5
We shall now give the proof that the new principle R is arithmetically va-
lid in all reasonable theories. In the proof we shall employ some well-known
arithmetical facts. We will now first briefly summarize these facts.
Definition 5.1. A definable T -cut is a formula I(x) with one free variable,
such that T ⊢ I(0) ∧ ∀x (I(x)→ I(x + 1)). Cut(·) will denote the function that
assigns to the code of a formula ϕ, the code of the formula expressing that ϕ is
a cut, that is, ϕ(0)∧∀x (ϕ(x)→ ϕ(x+1)) (whenever ϕ is of the right format).
The function Cut(·) is a very easy function. It is certainly provably total in
I∆0 + Ω1. In this section we shall denote the translation of a formula ϕ under
an interpretation j by j(ϕ). If I is a cut and ϕ a formula, we shall by ϕI denote
the formula ϕ, where all the quantifiers in ϕ are relativized to the cut I. The
following lemma is mentioned (as an exercise) in [23]. It is central to many
arguments in the field of formalized interpretability.
Lemma 5.2 (Pudla´k). There exists a function f , provably total in I∆0 + Ω1,
such that for any reasonable arithmetical theory T , the following holds.
T ⊢ j : α✄T β → [✷TCut(f(j)) ∧ ∀σ∈Σ1! j : α ∧ σ
f(j)
✄T β ∧ σ]
Another fact from arithmetic that we shall need, is that we can perform
the Henkin construction using numbers from a cut. This is expressed by the
following lemma.
Lemma 5.3. For any reasonable arithmetical theory T we have that
T ⊢ ✷T (Cut(I))→ ✸
I
Tα✄T α.
5In fact, we have strong evidence that actually ILRW 6= IL(All).
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These two lemmas are enough to prove the arithmetical soundness of the
principle R. Note that the j, I, α and β in Lemma 5.2 en 5.3 are parameters
and hence could be universally quantified within the theory.
Theorem 5.4 (Soundness of R). For any reasonable arithmetical theory T we
have the following.
T ⊢ α✄ β → ¬(α✄ ¬γ)✄ β ∧ ✷γ
Bewijs. Let f denote the function from Lemma 5.2. To prove our theorem, we
reason in T and assume α✄β. Thus, for some interpretation j we have j : α✄β.
We now claim that
¬(α✄ ¬γ)→ ✸(α ∧ ✷f(j)γ). (+)
Let us first see that this claim, indeed entails the result.
¬(α✄ ¬γ) ✄ By (+)
✸(α ∧ ✷f(j)γ) ✄ By J5
α ∧ ✷f(j)γ ✄ By Lemma 5.2 and j : α✄ β
β ∧ ✷γ
Thus, now we only need to prove the claim. We will prove (+) by showing the
logical equivalent
✷(α→ ✸f(j)¬γ)→ α✄ ¬γ. (++)
We reason as follows.
✷(α→ ✸f(j)¬γ) → By J1
α✄✸f(j)¬γ → By Lemma 5.3 and J2
α✄ ¬γ
⊣
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